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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
WILLIAM B DGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

a corporation

Plaintiff and D f nda nt
vs.

E.N.MAUGHA

as County Treasurer of

Cache County, State of Utah,
Defendant an-d Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

GEORGE D. PRESTON
LEON FONNESBECK
Attorneys fo r Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
WILLIAM BUDGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
a corporation,
Plai11tiff and Defenda·nt

vs.
E. N. MAUGHAN, as County Treasurer of

Cache County, State of Utah,
Defendant and Appellant

In this case the plaintiff, William Budge Memorial
Hospital, a corporation, brought a·n injunction against the

County Treasurer of Cache County to enjoin him from
collecting the taxes, $991.46, levied and assessed as the
general state and county taxes against the property of
plaintiff for the year 1928. The injunction is sought on
the alleged ground that the plaintiff's property is used
exclusively for charitable purposes and is therefore exempt. The plaintiff's claim that its property is exempt

was denied by defendant, and defendant affirmatively
alleged that plaintiff was a corporation organized for
pecuniary profit and gain, and that its property was not
used exclusively for charitable purposes but that all pat-

ients who entered its hospital were required to pay the
regular and substantial hospital fees, etc. The trial court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

found and held that plaintiff's property was used exclu~
ively for charitable purposes and was therefore exempt
and enjoined defenda:nt from collecting said tax or any
part thereof. A new trial having been asked by defendant and denied by the court, the defendant now appeals
to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The plaintiff is a corporation organized in 1914 un-

der the laws of this State, as the Budge ~Hospital with a
capital stock of $35,000.00 divided into 3500 shares at
$10.00 each. It was organized as the articles of incorpor-

ation show, in all respects as other stock share corporations, organized for pecuniary profit and gain. The hospital owns its grounds, buildings, furniture, and equipment. The main building and the Nurses Home are both
three story buildings, in addition to the basements. The
main building is 100 feet long by 40 feet in width, and
the Nurses Home is 80 feet long by 40 feet in width. The
rates charged by the hospital are $2.50 per day in a ward,
$4.00 per day for private room, with a few rooms at $5.00
per day (Ab. 23).
The purpose of the organization of the corporation
is stated in article 6 as follows:
Article 6.
"That the purpose of said corporation and the business for which the same is formed, is to build, establish,
operate and maintain, at Logan City, Utah, and at such
other place or places as may be decided upon by the
board of directors, a hospital, or hospitals, for the treat-
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ment and care of persons suffering from any and all ailments, e..xcepting the treatment of such ailments and diseases as may be, by the by-laws of said corporation, excluded, and to install in said hospital any and all conveniences equipments and appliances for the proper care and
treatment of the patients of said hospital or hospitals: to
acquire, own and hold real estate and all kinds of personal property and mixed property and to sell, mortgage,
hypothicate a·nd otherwise dispose of the same; to acquire,
hold and own, sell, mortgage, hypothicate and otherwise
dispose of all other kinds of property, rights, privileges
and franchises that may be deemed of value or useful in
carrying out any of the purposes of the corporation; to
incur indebtedness in such amount as may b~ deemed
necessary or expedient; to buy or otherwise acquire, sell
and dispose of stock in other corporations, or associations
organized for any purpose similar to this corporation and
in general to do anything incidental to the main purpose
of this corporation which in the discretion of the board of
directors for the time being may be considered necessary,
convenient and proper to carry out said corporate purposes.''

Shortly after its incorporation its capital stock was
increased and the name of the Hospital was changed from
the "Budge-Hospital" to the "Utah-Idaho Hospital", under
which name the plaintiff operated until 1927, when the
name was changed

to

"The William Budge Memorial

Hospital".
J.n the latter part of January and the fore-part of
February, 1928, an attempt was made to alter or change
the purpose of the corporation by an attempted amendment of Article 6. The "Notice of Stockholders Meeting",
mailed out by the Secretary (Plaintiff's Exhibit C) sets
forth the proposed amendment, and is as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

"Notice of Stockholders Meeting.
To the Stockholders of the William Budge Memorial
Hospital:
You will please take notice that the annual meeting
of the stockholders of the William Budge Memorial Hospital will be held at the Hospital Building in Logan, Utah,
on Tuesday the 31st day of January 1928, at 2 o'clock P.
M. of said day.
You are further advised that in addition to the ordinary business of the corporation the stockholders will
consider the advisability of amending Article Six of the
Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation to read as
follows:
ARTICLE VI.
The corporation is created for the purpose of maintaining, operating, and conducti~ng hospitals and other
institutions for the care and treatment of sick, wounded,
injured and infirm persons, of maintaining schools and
other places for the education and training of nurses; of
acquiring, holding, owning and controlling suitable
grounds and structures to carry out the objects of this
corporation, with power to receive from any source wha~
ever gifts, donations devises and bequests of real and personal property, for the use and benefit of the corporation;
to charge and receive compensation for nursi·ng and treating patients; to nurse and treat patients free of charge
whenever, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, they
are worthy objects of charity; to have and exercise all the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

rights, po"·ers and prh··iledges given to such corporation by
common Ia"·: to sue and be sued: to borrow n1oney and

sr~-t·

ure the payment thereof by notes, mortg·ages and deeds of
trust upon the personal and real property of the corporation: to moratgage. incumber, lease, sell or convey such real
and personal property as may be necessary and proper to

carry out the objects of the corporation. unless such property has been received as a gift or devise for some special
purpose. and if so received, it shall be used and applied
only for such a purpose, provided, however, that in no
event shall any profit result from the management or
operation of this Corporation, of any of its hospitals or
properties, to the incorporators, or stockholders herein, or
to any other person, except the general public, for whose

benefit this corporation has been

organized,

and

all

money received by this corporation from any source whatever, in excess of the actually necessary expenses and disbursements required for carrying out the objects of this
Corporation, shall be used and held for the sole benefit
and advantage of this corporation, in the furthering of
the charitable purposes for

w~ich

it has been organized.

"From net profits arising from the hospitals or other
properties of the Corporation, if any such profits there
shall be, the Board of Directors shall, from time to time,
set apart, as a sinking fund, such sums as it may deem advisable, to be used whenever, in the opinion of the Board,
the same should be used for the. maintainance, enlargement or improvement of the hospitals or other corporate
properties."
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"It is the opinion of the Board of Directors that this
amendment should be made as it would be for the bem
interest of the hospital.

1.:

lr

"By reason of the recent change made in the name of

the Hospital, from Utah-Idaho Hospital to William Budge
Memorial Hospital, it will be necessary for you to send in
your stock certificate properly signed, so that a new stock
certificate bea.ring the name of WILLIAM BUDGE MEl\10RIAL HOSPITAL can be issued to you.. We would
thank you to give this your immediate attention so that
the cha:nge can be made witho~ut delay.
''Also kindly give us your latest address so that future notifications may be properly forwarded to you.
William Budge Memorial Hospital.

Geo. Y. Smith, Secretary."
The policy of the hospital is to cha.rge all patients,
who enter its doors for care and treatment, the regular
hospital fees. If the patient is sent to the hospital by the
Relief Society, the Bishop of a Ward, or any social clubs,

etc., the policy of the hospital is to charge, and it aims to
collect from the members of .such relief society, ward,
church or club the full and regular hospital fees due from
such poor patient. The Hospital ha.s no policy to even reduce its regular hospital charge or fee to such poor patients.

If the patient is impecunious and unable to pay

the hospital fees, and is not sponsored or taken care of
by the Relief Society, Bishop of the Ward, or club, etc.,
then it is the policy of the hospital to apply to the County
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Con1missioners of Cache County and haYe the County pay
the regular hospital charg-e or fee for such poor patient.

The statements and bills so presented by the hospital to
the County have always been paid by the County to the
hospital as presented and have been paid out of the County
poor fund (Ab. 51).
That it is the policy of plaintiff to thus charge its regular hospital fee from all patients \\·ho enter its doors for
care and treatment is to a large extent admitted by the
pleadi11cas: In paragraph 3 of the Reply we read:
''but plaintiff alleges the facts to be in that respect that
the plaintiff has at all times charged patients who entered i~ hoSpital for care cp1d treatment only such hospital
fees as were fair, reasonable and moderate and necessary
to be charged for the maintenance, operation and upkeep
of said hospital, including the purchase of necessary
equipment and the providing of necessary facilities for
proper hospital service for the people of the section of
country served by said hospital; and that all the income
of said hospital has at all times been devoted to said purposes and has been used for no other purpose."
Again in paragraph 4 of the Reply:
"Answering paragraph IV plaintiff admits that it has
been is policy during the year 1928, and prior thereto, to
collect its regular hospital fees from all patients entering
its hospital for care and treatment who were able to pay,
and admits that at various and diverse times plaintiff has
applied to the County Commissioners of Cache County for
the payment of hospital fees for care and treat~ent of
indigent persons cared for and treated at its hospital."
That such is the policy of the plaintiff Hospital is also
frankly admitted by Dr. D. C. Budge, the Medical Director
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of the plaintiff Hospital and Chairman of the Medical
Staff, in his direct examination (Ab. 23, 24):
"The territory served by the hospital is Cache Valley,
Box Elder County, Rich County, Bear Lake, and Southe~n
Idaho. All patients who applied in 1928 were admitted
except contagious diseases and insanity cases.. Patients
were sent to the hospital by anybody, ·bishops of wards
and churches, Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, and other organizations. No distinction was made as to race, color,
or creed. All patients were charged.

..,

•.I

Q.: No matter from what source they came?

A.: We would attempt to have patients pay, yes. I
think they did .not all pay in 1928. Our policy in 1928 was
to have it understood and the patients are notified as early
as possible, or the responsible party appraised, that the
hospital bills must be paid. It is expected that the bills
will be paid by the time they are ready to leave the
hospital.
Q.: Your policy is to collect from all?

A.: Yes, or as much as we can do so.
Q.: In other words, so that I may understand you, if

any org~nization or a bishop of a ward or the Rotary club
or some other organization sent a patient there you would
attempt to get pay from the members of the organization
that se.nt the patients?
A.: Yes."
And also in his cross-examination (A b. 25, 26, 28):
"Once in a while we get patients from wards, the
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Bishop g:h·es notice to us that they are sendin~~: a patient.
The patient is admitted as a charity case, but the patient
is billed for the an1ount of the hospital t·harg·e, the same
as any other patient. The san1e is true '\'hen the patient
is brought in by the Rotary clubs, or the Bishop of the

wards, or other relief organizations.
The County occasionally sends poor patients to the
hospital, and they are charged the same rate as other
patients, including fees for laboratories, tests, X-rays,
etc. In such cases we bill the County for the amount of
the ha;pital fees. The County understands that the case
is a county charge. The County pays for all patients sent
to the hospital from the County. I call a patient that we
receive from the county ·a charity patient although the
County pays for all the charges. In the same way I call
the patients we receive from a ward in the church a
charity patient, although the Bishop pays the hospital fees.
If only the hospital part of it is paid, we call it a charity
case.

If the doctor's fee is paid, then it is not a charity case.

It is a charity case so far as the hospital is concerned, although the hospital fees are paid, because the hospital
takes all the fees that it receives and puts them back into
the institution for its maintenance and expense, and for
upbuilding and to make it better for patients that come
there hereafter; no member, director or officer or anybody
else gets a cent out of the institution. That is the reason
it is a charity institution.
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All patients who enter our hospital are charity patients so far as the hospital is concerned. There is no
distinction so far as the hospital is concerned whether the
party who goes and pays his own way or whether the patient is paid for. by the Bishop of the ward or the Church,
or the County.

i<

I

As near as it can the hospital aims to colleGt its hospital charges in all cases. The ·hospital does not receive
patients as a purely charity case with the idea that there
is no charge for the patients from any source. When they
come there they understand that the hospital fee is to be

·r

paid from some source. I don't remember of any case in
1928 who came there and said they couldn't pay for the

hospital charges where the hospital has taken care of
them***
The witness:

As I stated this morning, there is no

distinction so far as the hospital fees are concerned
whether the patient was produced by a member of the
staff, or by the ward, or by the County or a club. In all
cases the hospital fees must be paid. Although that is a
fact, I still consider them charity cases.

No matter

whether the Bishop paid for the poor patient or who paid,
or if it was a charity organization or a church or anybody
else, it was considered a charity case. If the man paid his
ow.n hospital fees and did not pay the doctor's fee, I
would say it was a charity case.
Although the ·hospital fees are paid by the patient, it
is still a charity case. If, for example, John Smith should
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bring his wife to our hospital and she should unrler-g'O an
operation, if he paid the hospital fee for his wife but did
not pay for the doctor's fee for the operation, \\"e would
consider it a charity case. The X-ray is a part of the hospital charge a-nd is collected by the hospital at the tin1e.
75 percent of all the X-ray charges go to Budge Clinic.
The hospital pays this percentage to the doctor who operates the X-ray machine because the X-ray is such a technical instrument. and particularly the reading

of

the

pictures that it requires an expert, and the hospital pays
him that percentage for his services.,.
Likewise, the haspital Superintendent, 0. J. Larsen,
testified that all patients were told when they entered the
hospital that they were expected to pay the hospital or
make arrangements to pay the hospital fee before they
left; that the hospital fees, which the plaintiff hospital
charges and tries to collect are the regular charges that
are charged all patients, standard hospital charges; that
the total unpaid hospital accounts for

the

year

1928

amounted to only $272.76, which he as such superintendent had made every effort to collect (Ab. 37). The gross
earnings of the ·hospital in 1928 was in excess of $48,000.00,
all of which wes collected, except the $272.00 (Ab. 35).
The net earnings of the hospital for the year 1928 was
$5000.00 (Exhibit 12).

In addition to the above admissions by the plaintiff,
it must also be kept in mind that the defendant offered to

prove by witnesses subpoenaed and present at the trial
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that not only was it the policy of the plaintiff hospital to
collect its regular hospital fees from all its patients, including poor patients, but that on many occasions, covering a period of 8 to 10 years prior to 1928, the plaintiff
hospital had actually on various occasions detained its
poor patients and prevented them from leaving the hospital until the liospital fees were paid. The objection to
the introduction of this testimony was sustained by the
Court on the ground that it was incompetent (too remote)
and cumulative.. To that rulirng of the Court defendant
excepted, and cites as error (A b. 56, Error No. 4).
·The plaintiff hospital is a closed hospital, all major
surgery is confined exclusively to Dr. D. C.. Budge and his
brother S. M. Budge whom he has taken in with him on
the surgery end, both are members of the Budge Clinic.
The operation. of the X-ray machine is confined to Doctor
Hayward (Ab. 30), who is a brother-in-law of Dr.. D. C.
Budge, arid a member of the Budge ·clinic, and the medical
staff of the hospital (Ab. 39)~ The Budge Clinic gets
75% of all laboratory and X-ray fees charged and collected by the hospital from the patients. The hospital keeps
up and pays all expenses in connection with the X-ray
machine as well as the laboratory, out of its 25lfo split.
The 75Cfo of the gross earnings from these two sources are
paid over to the Budge Clinic by the hospital without any
deductions for any portion of the expense (Ab. 37). The
hospital fees thus collected by the hospital, for laboratory
and X-ray service and tuflned over to the Budge Clinic in
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amounted to $6170.06 (A b. 5~). The inco1ne to the
hospital from the X-ray for the year 19~~ was $1-11·-1.~5:
the X-ray expense to the hospital for the year 1~l~~ was
$1116.60 in addition to the expense for supplies for the
X-ray, electric energy charge, etc. (A b. 36).
The complaint alleges that the hospital is a corporation, and owns certain property with the buildings thereon which have been maintained and operated for the care
and treatment of the sick, injured and infirm persons, and
that plaintiff has also maintained and conducted a home
for the accommodation, comfort and education and train·
ing of nurses, and that the said real estate is necessary
for the convenient use and occupation of the said hospital
equipment and plant; which allegations are admitted by
the Answer.

The complaint also alleges that the said

property of the plaintiff corporation with the buildings
thereon, has at all times been used and now is used exclusively for charitable purposes, which allegation is denied by the Answer.
The Answer affirmatively alleges and the Reply admits:
1. That the plaintiff, William Budge Memorial·Hos-

pital, is the same corporation as the Utah-Idaho Hospital,
which was organized April 24, 1914.
2. That plaintiff corporation has paid taxes each
year on its property since its organization prior to 1928.
3. That it has been the policy of the plaintiff during
the year 1928, and prior thereto, to charge and collect its
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regular hospital fees from all patients entering its hospital for care and treatment.
. That at various and diverse times plaintiff has applied to the County Commis'sioners for the payment of
hospital fees for the care and treatment of indigent persons cared for and treated at its hospital.
The Answer alleges affirmatively, amd the Reply denies, thus putting in issue the following allegations:
1. That the Utah-Idaho Hospital was organized as
a corporation· for pecuniary profit, and that neither under
the name of the Utah-Idaho Hospital, nor the William
Budge Memorial Hospital, has the plaintiff complied with
the laws of this State governing the organization of corporations not for pecuniary profit and gain.
2.

That during the year 1928, and for many years

prior thereto it has been the policy of the plaintiff to demand and collect large and substantial hospital fees from
all patients entering its hospital for care and treatment,
and that such fees be paid before patients left the hospital; which has necessitated at times public subscription
a'lld donation in order to relieve poor patients.
3. That plaintiff's hospital is not open to all medical
practitioners in good standing, but is operated for the use,
benefit, and gain of certain members of the medical profession belonging to or affiliated with the Budg.e Clinic,
who own or control a majority of the stock of the plaintiff
corporation, and thus dominate the policy of the hospital.
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ARGUMENT.

These matters thus put in issue all go to tht\ one big
and controlling question before the court in this case: Is
the plaintiff a charitable institution, and is its property

used ~TclusiPely for charitable piH'poses? If it is, then all
will agree that the plaintiff is entitled to have its property
exempt from the payment of taxes. If plaintiff's property is not thus used, then plai-ntiff should be required to
pay its fair share of the taxes, for it is the mandate of the
Constitution and the laws of this State, that ~'all property
in the state (not exempt) shall be taxed in proportion to
its value.., {Article 13, Sec. ~. Constitution; Sec. 5861,
Compiled Laws 1917).
It is submitted that the trial court erred in its judgment holding that plaintiff's property was used exclusively for charitable purposes and was therefore exempt from

the payment of taxes, and perma·nently enjoining the defendant, as County Treasurer of Cache County, from collecting the taxes levied and assessed against the plaintiff's property for the year 1928, for the following reasons:
A.

From the admissions made and conceded by the
plaintiff in its pleadings, it affirmatively appears that the
plaintiff is not a charitable institution and that its property is not used exclusively for charitable purposes; for in
the Reply it is affirmatively alleged, and admitted: (1)
That plaintiff is the same corporation as the Utah-Idah~
Hospital and owns and conducts the same hospital property, (and the Articles of Incorporation admitted in evi-
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de.nce conclusively show that the Utah-Idaho Hospital was
organized for the purpose of carrying on said hospital
business for pecuniary profit and gain); (2) That plaintiff has at all times charged the patients who entered its
hospital reasonable fees, necessary for the maintenance,
operation and upkeep of the hospital, includi·ng the purchase of necessary equipment and providing necessary
facilities, etc.
(3) That it was the plaintiff's policy
during the year 1928, and prior thereto, "to collect its
regular hospital fees from all patients entering its hospital for care and treatment who were able to pay, and
admits that at various and diverse times plaintiff has applied to the County Commissioners of Cache County for
the payment of hospital fees for care and treatment of indigent persons cared for and treated at its hospital." From
such admissions in the pleadings, it is submitted the
judgment holding that plaintiff's property is used exclusively for charitable purposes is erroneous and can not
be sustained.
B. From the plaintiff's own testimony it affirmatively and conclusively appears that the plaintiff's hospital property is not used for charitable purposes, but is
used in carrying on the business of conducting a private
hospital as a regular and ordi·n.ary business institution,
and for the private interest and benefit of those who manage
. and control it. Dr.. D. C. Budge stated that he considered all patients, at the hospital charity patients so far
as the hospital was concerned, although the full hospital
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fees were paid. Manifestly that is not tht."\ Ia'"· \Vhen tht\
recipients pay for what they receive

charity.

tlH'Y art\

not on

Phillips vs. St. Le'vis R. R. Co.. 17 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 1167 Mo.
C. Defendanfs Exhibit 12. made from the Report
of Plaintiff's Auditor, Parley Petersen, on the books of the
plaintiff corporation for the year 1928, shows that the
plaintiff made a net gain in the year 1928 of in excess of
$5000.00, over all expenses and disbursements for that
year. The books of the plaintiff corporation also show
that during the year 1928. the gross receipts (gross hospital charges collected from patients) were in excess of
$48,000.00, and that the hospital collected all of this
money except $272.00 (about ! of one percent), which
was represented largely by sundry small X-ray and laboratory accounts, of which amounts the Budge Clinic is

entitled to 75CC and the hospital to only 25o/o, when the
same is collected by the hospital.

It is submitted that a11: institution which can show a
net gain (net earnings) for the year of $5000.00 and
which has collected within one-half of one percent of all
its accounts during the year is a very successful business

and not a charitable institution, and is not entitled to
have its pr()perty exempt on the ground that i~ is used exclusively for charitable purposes.
Prior to the year 1927, the hospital had paid off an
obligation of $10,000.00 and had in addition to that accumulated a surplus of $31,000.00, since its organization
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in 1914.. This $31,000.00 was put into the Nurses' Home
built in 1927. This also shows that it is a successful and
g-rowing business institution.
D. The purported amendment to Article 6, voted on
January 31st, 1928, and filed on February 11, 1928, was
and is not effective and cannot aid the plaintiff corporation in its effort to avoid payment of its taxes on the hospital property, for: (1) The amendment purports to alter
o:r change the original purpose of the corporation, which,

under ou:r statutes, can not be done except by the approval and consent of all of the outstanding stock (Sec. 886,
Compiled Laws 1917). There was, as appears from the
evidence, at the time of the proposed amendn1ent 4042
shares of stock outstanding in plaintiff corporation and
from the certified minute entry by the Secretary, attached and filed with the proposed amendment (Plaintiff's Exhibit C). it affirmatively appears that there were only
2260 .shares of stock represented at the. stockholder's
meeting when the proposed amendment was voted, and
adopted. It is therefore submitted that the proposed
amendment is void and of .no force or effect, and did not
in fact alter or change the original purpose of the corporation. It follows that the plaintiff is not organized .as a
charitable institution at the present time. It is organized
~

any other fina.ncial business corporation, whether the
profit and gain goes to the corporation, for its further
growth and expansion, or to the stockholders, is immaterial so far as its liability to pay taxes is .concerned;
Lodge vs. Speth, 106 Pac.. 1077 (Ka:n.).
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The la\\" required that if plain tift. \Vas

or~~: an ized

for

pecuniary profit it n1ust set forth the amount of it:' r:tpital
stock and shares. This the plaintitl' did. The .-\ rt iciPs
are in harmony with a business corporation. and \\'holly
inconsistant with those of a charitable organization. "The
fact that plaintiff corporation "·as formed and org·anized
to treat and care for the sick and injured is not controlling for such thing may be done for profit as well as for
charity.••

Holy Cross Hospital, 88 Pac. 691 (Utah).
Public Society vs. Board of Review, 125 N. E. 7 (Ill.)
People vs. Hospital, 87 N. E. 305.
The right to an exemption can only be established by
strict proof of the existence of all facts necessary to
authorize it. Institutions must be organized for public
charity, and not for profit, and an essential element is that
it shall not have the power to declare dividends.
Plaintiff also pays a corporation license tax, and has
done so up to the present time, which it would not be requested to do if it was a charitable corporation, or a corporation not organized for pecuniary profit. Sec. 1271
Comp. Laws, 1917.
(2) If we assume the proposed amendment did alter
the original purpose of the plaintiff corporation, still it
does not aid the plaintiff for it came subsequent to the
time when the tax lien had actually attached for the year
1928, and therefore, could not affect or relieve the plain-

tiff from its liability to pay its taxes which had already
accrued for that year.
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The tax lien on plaintiff's personal property for 1928,
attached to plaintiff's real estate, as of January 1, 1928,
and the tax lien for the real estate and improvements for
1928, attached as of the second Monday in January, 1928
-Sec. 5996, 5997, Comp. Laws, 1917, Sec. 5995, specifically provides that the tax lien is not satisfied or removed
until the tax is paid. In the case of Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co. vs. Black, 24 7 Pac. 486, this Court approves and upholds this provision of the law.
"

E. The plaintiff admits in its Reply, and the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff regularly files its
claim against Cache County to cover the hospital fee for
i·ndige.nt poor patients who are treated at the hospital and
are unable to pay the hospital charges. It is submitted
that the plaintiff has thereby forfeited its rig~t to claim
that its property i·s exempt from taxes on. any ground to
claim that its property is used for charitable purposes to
such an extent that it should be exempt from the payment
of taxes.
The theory upon which tax exemption is granted to
charitable institutio.ns, is, that by dispensing charity and
relief to the poor and those in need of help, (which aoo
otherwise a burden on the state and ·society) the State
and society is benefitted to a larger extent than the
1

amount of the taxes, which would otherwise be received
from such institution, for the state is thus relieved of the
burden which otherwise devolves upon it and society,-to
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care for poor and indigent persons who are sick and un-

able to care for then1selves.
~6

R.

r.

L 316.

Commissioners vs. Makibben,

~9

A. S. R. :l~~ (Ky.).

Public Society vs. Board of Revie\\·,

1~5

N. E. 7 (Ill.).

"The theory justifying exemption of this class
of property so used is that the resultant benefits
to the body politic will be equal to or in excess of
the fa"<es \\·hich would otherwise be imposed,
and such religious, scientific, literary or charitable use of the property should be encouraged by
relief from taxation. But the statute says it shall
only be exempt when the property is used for
these purposes, and not held or leased out for
profit. It is a rule so well established as to need
no citation of authority, that it is incumbent upon
the person who claims his property as exempt
from taxation to show that the use of that property clearly falls within the exception. The rule
of strict construction applies, and, if any doubt
arises as to the exemption, that doubt must be
decided against the person who claims the exemption. While it must be borne in mind that the
decisions of other jurisdictions are largely influenced by their constitutional and statutory
provisions, it is quite generally held that where
property belonging to a charitable institution is
rented out or otherwise employed as a source of
profit to the institution, it is not sufficient to save
that property from taxation because the rent or
income is devoted exclusively to charitable purposes; the exemption is generally held to apply
only to the property which is actually used and
occupied for the charitable purposes for which
the institution is organized."
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The Court then cites a long list of cases and continues:
"It is sufficient to .say that the great weight of
autho~ity appears to be that, because the rents,
issues, and profits of the property of a charitable
institution are used for the purposes of charity,
that fact will not exempt the property itself from
taxation, under the rule of strict construction applicable where property is claimed to be exempt
under the exceptions to the general rule that all
property must bear its equal burdens of taxation."
State vs. McDowell Lodge, 38 A. L. R. 31 (W. Va.).
The evidence shows that the plaintiff hospital is not
a hospital open to all medical practitioners in good standing in the medical association of this state, but is operated largely for the benefit and gain of certain members of
the medical profession belonging to or affiliated with the
Budge Clinic. The evidence also shows that the members
of the Budge Clinic and those immediatelr associated with
them own and control the majority of the stock of the
plaintiff corporation; that Dr. D. C. Budge has been the
medical director of the hospital and chairman of the
medical staff since the organization of the hospital, and
that he was the chief moving factor in its organization.
That he absolutely controls the policy of the hospital by
the special provisions of tlie Articles of Incorporation, to
which we direct the cou"rt'.s attention. It will be observed
from the articles of incorporation that the Board of Directors do not control the internal policy of the hospital,
but that the same is left with the medical director and the
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medical staff. Dr. D. C. Budge has done all of tht' Jnajor
operations in the hospital since its incorporation, exct.\pt
such as has bee-n done in later years by his brotherS. M.
Budge, who has

no"~

been associated \vith Dr. D. C. Buch?.·e

in the surgical work.
The evidence also shows that the Budge Clinic receives 75% of the gross earnings of the hospital from a 11
X-ray and laboratory fees and that such earnings are paid
to the Bu«L:,o-e Clinic without any deduction of any expense,
and that the hospital is required to keep up the said machine and furnish all supplies, expenses, etc., connected
with the -X-ray machine and the laboratory work out of
the 25~ split which goes to the hospital.
We also call attention to the evidence produced by
Dr. E. L. Hansen (Ab. 61 and pages following) wherein
it conclusively appears that the hospital was not open to
qualified physicians in good standing except such as Dr.
D. C. Budge and his associates chose to admit. It is therefore, submitted that the plaintiff hospital is operated and
conducted for the professional and financial benefit of
certain physicians, particularly the physicians belonging
to the Budge Clinic,' and that its argument in regard to

receiving charity patients is a mere pretense and made
for the purpose of bringing the plaintiff corporation within the statute exempting its property from taxation on
the ground that it is a public charity and that its property
is used exclusively for charity purposes.
In the Sisters of the Third Order vs. Board of R•-
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view, 83 N.. E. 272, the Illinois Supreme Court definitely
lays down the rule that under such a state of facts plaintiff institution is not entitled to tax exemption.
"If a hospital is conducted for the use and
profit of persons engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery (City of Knoxville vs. Ft. Sanders Hospital, 148 Tenn. 699, 257 S. W. 408;
Mayor and Aldermen vs. Vicksburg Sanitarium,
17 Miss. 709, 78 So. 702), or as wn adjunct to a
medical college conducted for the profit of its
owners (Gray Street Infirmary vs.. City of Louisville, 65 S. W. 11, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1274, 55 L. R.
A.) 270), it cannot be regarded a~s a charitable
institution, and is subject to taxation. This is in
accord with our holding concerning business colleges in the case of Lawrence Business College v.
Bussing, 117 Kan. 436, 231 P. 1039."
Nuns of Third Order of St. Dominic vs. Younkin, 235
P. 872.
In the Younken case the Kansas court held that the
property of that hospital was, however, exempt from taxation for the reason that the corporation was organized
for benevolent and charitable purposes, had no capital
stock,

~could

decleare no dividends and earned none, and

devoted all of its income to the care of sick and injured
who were unable to pay.

These facts distinguish the

Younken case from the case at bar.
In addition to that it should be kept in mind that the
only patients whq are accepted at the hospital without
any charge being made against them are the members of
the medical staff and their families.
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The question of exemption fron1 payment of taxes on
the ground that the property \\·as used exclusi,·t\ly for

charitable purposes has been before our Suprenlt\ Court
in the follo""ing cases:
Ju~ae vs. Spencer, 15, Utah,

24~.

State vs ...-\.rmstrong, 17 LTtah, 166.

Parker vs. Quinn, 23 LTta.h, 332, 64 Pac. 961.
Lodge

\'S.

Grosbeck, 40 Utah 1, Ann. Cas. 1914 C 940.

Odd Fellows Assn. vs.. Co. Treasurer. 53 Utah, 111.
In the Spencel' case. the Court used the following
language , in regard to the claim of exemption:
"The presumption is that all exemptions intended to be granted were granted in express terms.
In such cases the rule of strict construction applies, and, in order to relieve any species of property from its due and just proportion of the burdens of the government, the language relied on,
as creating the exemption, should be so clear as
not to admit of reasonable controversy about its
meaning, for all doubts must be resolved against
the exemption."
In the Armstrong case, supra, the question involved

was whether or not the Legislature had power to provide
by statute that the Board of Equalization might remit or
abate the taxes of insane, idiotic, infirm, or indigent per-

sons, the court held that an abatement of the taxes in
effect amount to an exemption, and that the Legislature
had no such authority and used the following language:
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"The difference in the sense of these terms
therefore relates to the method, rather than the
effect; for the ultimate result, whether by exemption or abatement, is precisely the same. In either
case the property is relieved from the burden of
taxation. Now it is apprehended that the intention of the framers of the constitution, by exempting certain property, was not so much to prevent an assessment and levy of tax thereon as to
free it from the burden of mai,ntaining the government. When the tax is abated or remitted
after it has been levied, the same object is accomplished; and therefore the mandate of the
constitution, that such burdens 'shall be equal
and uruiform" on all property within the state,
except such as is exempt by the fundamental
law, and that 'every person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or
its property,' may·be violated by either method.
It is true that the statute does not permit the
abatement of all the tax, a:s does an exemption
under the constitution; but it is equally true that
if the legislature has power to enact a statute releasing property, not exempt by the paramount
law, from a portion of the tax, it has power to
enact one abating all the tax on such property.
The ~arne legal principles apply in either case.
The meaning and intent manifest from the constitution are that no property shall be relieved
f'rom the burden of maintaining the government,
except such as was defin,e.d and specified for exemption by that instrument. No one would contend for a moment that the legislature of thi·s
state has power in express terms to exempt property from taxation, other than that enumerated
for exemption in the constitution; and yet in the
enactment of the statute in question the legislat..
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ure has undertaken to indirectly exempt property

not so enumerated. This is an attempt to do indirectly that which could not be done directly,
and the statute therefore is in violation of the
constitution, and is void, as in excess of leg·islative authority. To prevent the legislature from
exempting property not included within the exemptions of the constitution, express words of inhibition were not necessary. The positive direction that "all property not exempt under the laws
of the United States or under this constitution
shall be taxed,' and that the rate of assessment
and taxation shall be 'uniform and equal', so that
'every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its property,' with the enumeration of· the property exempted, contains an implication against an exemption
of any other property by the legislature. That direction itself operates as a restraint upon the
legislative power. Cooley, C-onst. Lim. 209; Konold vs. Railway Co., 16 Utah 151. ··
In the case of Parker vs. Quinn, supra, the Relief
Society, organized exclusively for charitable purposes,

was the owner of a two-story building, the upper fioor was
used by the Society for holding its meetings, the lower
floor contained two store rooms, one of which was rented
for $12.50 per month, and the other was being offered for
the same rent. All the rental so received was used for
charitable purposes; all the members of the society served
as such without renumeration. The question involved \\ as
whether or not the property was used exclusively for
charitable purposes and therefore exempt from taxation.
The Lower Court held that the property was not exempt.
7
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The Supreme Court held that the lower floor was subject
to taxation, but that the upper floor, which was used exclush,ely by the society was exempt. The Court used the
following la·nguage:
"It will be noticed that the provisions of the
Constitution of the statute are practically the
same, except that the statute omits the words
"municipal corporations," but this omi·ssion is not
material in this case. The exemptiortS thus expressly g·ranted, as we have seen, form an exception to the general rule that every species of
property within the State is liable to bear its just
proportion of the public burden. Any prope1·ty
falling within the exceptian is releas.ed from this
burden, and such r,elease is iustified on the theory
that the State derives some peculiar benefit,
whatever that may be, {'rom such propert-y.
Among the several classes of property exempt are
'lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively
for either religious worship or .charitable purposes.' In the case at bar, the 'relief society'
which owns an.d manages the property, over
which the controversy arose, was organized a·nd
acts exclusi'VIely for charitable purposes.
It
ministers to the poor, sick and destitute of the
eo:nmunity. Its p~.Irposes ar~ excellent and the
nr.:·~ns adopted cc.mmendable, and no doubt the
State is mea:.surably benefitted by having its poor
and helpless subjects under the benign protection and care of such a society. If, therefore, in
the fundamental law, in addition to specifying
lots and buildings thereon used 'exclusively' for
charitable purposes, rentals derived from such
buildings and used for such purposes were also
enumerated, we would have no difficulty in this
case in declaring the whole property, including
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the portion rented and held for rent. exen1pted
fron1 taxation, but the la\\·makers did not see tit
to exen1pt such rentals, in express terms, and \':e
can furnish no aid by construction. Only such
of the society's property. therefore. as is occupied and used 'exclusively' for charitable purposes is e.'t:empt from taxation. It follo,vs that the
e.xemption does not extend to that portion not
appropriated by the society to its O\vn use, but
held as a source of revenue. Especially is this so
since the value of each portion is ascertainable
as appears from the findings of the court. Where,
therefore, as in this case. a portion of certain
property, owned by a charitable institution, is
occupied and used by it for charitable purposes,
and the other portion thereof is devoted to purposes of revenue, the portion used and occupied
for charitable purposes is exempt, and the portion not so used and occupied is subject to taxation."

In the Groesbeck case, supr~ the question involved
was whether the Elks Home of Salt Lake City was exempt from taxes. Our Supreme Court held, by divided
opinion, that it was. Justice Frick writes the dissenting
opinion, and we believe that it will be conceded that he
cites the great weight of authority in his dissenting opinion to the effect that even from the facts in that case the
property should not be exempt. However, the Supreme
Court did not over-rule the case of Parker vs. Quinn, but
expressly approved of that- case in the following language:
"The court held, (in Parker vs. Quinn) and
properly so, that the portion of the building
which was not used by the organization for its
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own purposes, but was kept as an investment for
business purposes, was not exempt from taxation."

In the Odd Fellows' case, supra, the question involved wa:s whether the Odd Fellow's home was exempt from
taxation. A porti~n of the building was leased and the
rents were used for the purposes of the association. Our
Supreme Court held that the property was not exempt
from taxation. The Supreme Court, in that case also expressly observed the fact that the Elks .case and Quinn
case were harmonious in principal. It was contended in
the Odd Fellows' case, that a:s long as the rents and income were used for the purpose of the association, that
the building should be exempt.
Our Supreme Court
states counsel's position, and answers it in the following
la:nguage:
"We submit that such a construction, in our
judgment, would amount to an absolute perversion of the plain meaning and intent of the framers of the Constitution and the citizens of the
state who afterwards voted for its adoption. If
we will consider for a moment the situation to
which such a .construction could and might possibly lead, every person of average intelligence
must at once arrive at the conclusion that such
cannot be the meaning wnd intention of the constitution. To begin with, .it must be· conceded
that the owners of property, to be exempt within
the purview of the Constitution, are not limited
to ecclesiastical or charitable organizations, but
the exemption p·rivilege is extended to the class
of property mentioned, without regard to the
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character of its O\\'ner. The owner may be a
church organization, a charitable or fraternal organization, or it may be a private indiYidual or a
corporation. It \viii also be conct~ded, \\'e assun1e,
that a very large proportion of the taxpayers of
the State of lltah annually contribute considerable sums to the maintenance of religious worship and for charitable purposes. The ag·gregate
of these contributions \vould undoubtedly, amount
to millions. Now, let us suppose that these taxpayers. whether individuals or corporations,
should conceive the idea that, inasmuch as they
intend to contribute in any event to these religious and benevolent purposes, they will do so in
such manner as to avoid the payment of taxes
on a substantial portion of their property. Each
of them, in pursuance of this idea, inves1s in a lot
or lots, with a building or buildings, to such an
extent that the income derived from the rents,
issues and profits of the property will pay for the
upkeep and repair thereof and enough over to
satisfy his conscience respecting his religious
and charitable obligations. Not a dollar for
private or corporate gain is within the contemlation of the owner, but in the utmost good faith
the owner intends to use every cent of the income, except sufficient for the upkeep and repair, for religious or charitable purposes. The
assessor appears on the scene; he attempts to
assess ihe property, and the owner says he is
using that property exclusively for religious
worship, or that he is using it exclusively for
charitable purposes and not for private or corporate benefit. Under the contention of counsel
for appellant, we do .not see why this could not be
done. If it can be done by an ecclesiastical or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
charitable organization it can be done by an individual or corporation who devotes the income
to religious or charitable purposes. If such were
done we have no means of knowing what the loss
in revenue to the state would be, but the ·sum
would unquestionably be so vast as to forever
preclude the idea that the Constitution is susceptible of any such construction as that contended for by appellant. On this question we
unqualifiedly approve that portion of the opinion
in the Quinn case, heretofore quoted, wherein
the learned justice says:
"If, therefore, in. the fundamental law, in addition to specifying lots and buildings thereon
used 'exclusively' for charitable purposes, rentals derived from such buildings and used for
such purposes were also enumerated, we would
have no diffi.culty in this case in declaring the
whole property, including the portion rented and
held for rent, exempted from taxation; but the
lawmakers did not see fit to exempt such rentals,
in express terms, and we can furnish no aid by
construction. Only suc;h of the society'·s property, therefore, as is occupied and used 'exclusively' for charitable purposes, is exempt from taxation. It follows that the exemption does not extend to that portion not appropriated by the
society to its own use, but held as a source of
revenue."
The question involved is of supreme importance, both to the taxpayers of the state at large
and to the owners of property claiming exemption from taxation. For that reason we have
quoted at considerable length from the opinion
in the Quinn case, which we cannot consider in
a;ny other light than as conclusive and controlling in the present .case.
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Much has bee.n said in ar~.nunent upon the
question as to \Vheth~r or not a strict or liht\ral
construction should be adopted in seeking· to ascertain the meanin~ of the constitutional provision involved. In our judg·tnent, as contended
by respondent, .. there is no t-oon1 for construction:· The language is plain. unequivocal, and
unambiguous. The building itself, or the portion
thereof for which exemption is claimed, as distinguished from the rent or income derived therefrom, must be used exclusively for religious worship or charitable }:lurposes. This "·e believe to
be the plain meaning of the Constitution, whether
we adopt a strict or a liberal construction. The
opinion in the Quinn case by an undivided court
held that to be the true meaning, and, as before
suggested, the Court in the Elks case unanimously adopted the same view, although disagreeing
on other questions not pertinent to this appeal.
As to the question of a strict or liberal construction, if it were at all controlling in this case,
we might suggest that appellant has no reason
whatever to complain. A strict construction of
the constitutional provision, as we understand it,
would subject the entire building to taxation, for
the reason that it is not all used exclusively for
religious worship or charitable purposes. We
are clearly of the opinion that the court in the
Quinn case adopted an exceedingly liberal construction when it held that the property might
be segregated for purposes of taxation."
The Groesbeck case is also to be distinguished from
case at bar, for in that case the Court assumed that the

Elks Lodge was a charitable institution, which as we
have already pointed out plaintiff clearly is not. It was
also said in the Groesbeck case that the social uses to
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which the property was put were indirectly to promote
the social aims of the organization, that the charity dispersed by fraternal societies consisted not only of material
assistance, but of moral assistance also, which was the
embodiment of sympathy and kindness, none of which
elements appear in the record in case at bar.
The annotation to the Groesbeck case in Ann. Cas.
1914C at page 958, points out, that in the two other Elks
Lodge cases which had then been. decided, Mass. and Wisconsin, both cases held contrary to the Utah case-that the
Elks home was .not exempt as property used exclusively
for charitable purposes.
In a subsequent case, Lodge V'S. Koeln, Ann, Cas.
1916E, 784, (Mo.) the Missouri court also pointed out that
the property of Elks Lodge No. 9, was used for lodge and
club purposes and was not used exclusively for charity
within the meaning and contemplation of the Constitution, and hence was not exempt from taxation. The Missouri Court held that the "exclusive" use provided for in
the Constitution, "implied that all other uses be excluded." The Missouri Court expressly refused to follow the
Groesbeck case.
It will, therefore, be observed that the Utah cases
are in harmony on the proposition that the property itself
(not the rentals or revenues derived therefrom) must be
used exclusively fo charitable purposes. In the Quinn
case, the Groesbeck case and the Odd Fellows case, the
orga,nizations w.ere in each respective case charitable or-
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ga~izations--organized

for l·haritable and

fratt~rnal

pur-

poses and for no other purpose. Such is not the case of
plaintiff corporation.

In the Groesbeck case the court

found and held that the Elks Lodge \vas a charitable institiution, and that in as much as the property was occupied and used by the lod~ itself for lodge purposes,
(which were admittedly charitable and fraternal) this
court held that, within the contemplation of the Constitution, the property was used for charitable purposes and
was therefore exempt.

The same distinction is made in the Quinn case, and
also the Odd Fellows case.

Both of these organizations

were found and in each case held to be charitable organizations,organized for charitable purposes.

That portion

of the property which was directly occupied and used by
the Relief Society was held to be used exclusively for a
charitable purpose, for the Relief Society was organized
for the purpose of dispensing charity. That portion of
the building which was not directly occupied and used by
the society itself, was held not to be exempt, even though
the rentals received therefrom were devoted to the purpose and use of the society. The same distinction and rule

is applied in the Odd Fellows case, and hence that portion

of the building not directly occupied and used by the lodge
itself, was held not to be exempt, although the rentals
from this property were devoted to the purpose of the
Lodge which were admittedly charitable.
It is submitted that the case at bar does not and can
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not con1e within this rule. In the first place the plaintiff
corporation was not and is not organized as a charitable
institution. It has every ear mark of a business institution organized for pecuniary gain and profit and none of
the ear marks of a ~haritable institution. In the second
place, as we have already poihted out, the evidence conclusively shows that it is not the policy of the hospital itself to disperse charity to any of its patients. The doc-·
tors often forego their doctor's fees to poor patients, but
the hospital fees must always be paid, either by the relief
society, the bishop of the ward or club which brings the
poor patient, or by the County, where the patient is impecunious and is not under the care of the Relief Society,
bishop, etc.
The plaintiff hospital rents its beds to its patients for
stipulated and fixed sums depending on the rooms selected by the patient; these charges are made to rich and poor
patients alike. A bed in a ward is $2.50 per day; a bed in
a semi-ward is $3.50 per day; a private room is $4.00 and
$5.00 per day; depending on the room.. It is true that in
addition to the bed the patient also receives certain service and care by the .nurses and. such food and drink as the
patient should have.. But this is all covered and paid for
by the patient in the hospital .charges.

The receipient

pays for the service and accommodations which he rece1ves.
Hence it is submitted that the various rooms occupied
and paid for by the patients come exactly within the same
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rule and provision as that portion of its property which
the Relief Society rented out in the Quinn case, or that
portion of the building, in the Odd Fellows case fron1
which rentals were received by the lodge

but

which

property was in each case held by this court not to be exempt fron1 the payment of taxes because not used exclusively for charitable purposes within the provision of
the Constitution.

Indeed, the property of plaintiff in the case at bar
does not come within the same equitable reason and considerations as was, and could well be urged on behalf of
the property so rented in the Quinn case, a·nd also in the
Odd Fellows case. There the rentals were, in each case,
used and devoted to the purposes of the organization which

purposes were admittedly charitable.

In the case at bar

the plaintiff organization or corporation is not charitable,
it was not organized as a charitable institution, and does
not use or purport to devote its earnings (rentals) from
im property for charitable purposes, but proposes to set it
aside as a sinking fund for future growth and expansion
of the corporation.
The fact that the plaintiff corporation adopts a rule,
in the form of an amendment to one of its articles, that' it
will not in the future declare any dividends to its stockholders, or pay its officers any salary, but will from time
to time set apart the net profits arising from the operation
of the hospital "as a sinking fund, to be used whenever,
in the opinion of the Board, the same should be used for

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38
the maintenance, enlargement or improvement of the hospitals or other corporate properties," does not present any
equitable reason that we can discern why that corporation should .not pay its taxes as the constitution and law
of our 'State provide.
It is of course obviou~ that the stockholders could at
some future time, when a large sinking fund has thus ac~
cumulated, again be called to meet and vote to change or
amend article six so as to permit the accumulated sinking
fund to be divided among the stockholders in the form of
dividends; or if the hospital buildings, equipment, etc.,
had been sufficiently enlarged, from such accumulated
sinking fund, article six could readily be changed back so
as to carry out the original purpose of the corporation and
thereafter permit dividends to be declared from the .net
earnings of the corporation, and the stockholders of the
corporation would thereby have received the full benefit
of avoiding payment of taxes for the intermittent period
of years. Undoubtedly this amendment was made and
intended for the best interest of the plaintiff corporation
itself, .not for the best interest of the public. It should be
noted that the Secretary in his Notice of Stockholders'
meeting said: "It is the opinion of the Board of Directors
that this amendment should be made as. it would be for
the best interest of the hospital.."
It must be very obvious to the Court that the only
purpose of the purported amendment to Article six was
an excuse to avoid payment of its taxes. The corpora-
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tion has paid its ta.~es each year since its incorporation in
1914, up to 1H28. and during all of this period, it is admitted both in the pleadings &"nd the testin1ony, that its
policy and method of operation and chan.!.·ing: and collecting its hospital bills from all patients who entered its hospital for care and treatment has been the same. There
has been no change in the policy of the ins~itution. That
being tru~ why should the plaintiff's property be exempt
from ta.~es for the year 19~8 as distinguished from prior
years? Plaintifrs counsel gave as his ans\\'er in the lower
court, that due to this amendment to article 6, no officer
or stockholder of the corporation did in 1928, nor will in
the future, make a dollar or a dime from the corporation,
but all of the earnings of the corporation are to be plowed
back into that institution for its enlargement and providing better hospital facilities etc., so as to better serve and
care for the general public and particularly its patients.

This merely amounts to saying that if the institution
had more money to spend for its development and purchase of the latest and most modern equipment, etc., then
it would be better able to serve and care for its patrons.
That is not only true of the business of conducting
and operating a hospital, but we believe, the ;merchant,
the banker, the cobbler, the baker, the manufacturer, and
all the rest could truthfully make the same argument,
e. g,. if they had more money to use and devote to their
respective business institutions, to make proper and necessary enlargements, additions and betterments, and in-
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stall the latest a:nd most modern equipment, etc., that then
they would in each case better serve and care for their
respective patrons and customers.
Undoubtedly a good many private business institutions would be very glad to thus amend their articles of
incorporation, and :provide that in the future all the earnings of the corporation shall be set aside as a sinking fund,
and that it shall, from time to time, be expended for the
proper enlargement. and betterment of the corporate properties as the Board of Directors may deem for the best
interest of the corporation.
If such method for avoiding payment of taxes is legal
for a hospital, organized and conducted as a private corporation for pecuniary profit and gain, then there seems
.no reason why other business institutions may not adopt
similar amendments to their articles of incorporation, and
thus also es.cape payment of taxes. The mere statement
of such a proposition is its own answer. To sanction such
conduct and method for avoiding payment of taxes,
strikes at once at the very root and foundation of our
government and nullifies the Constitution~
In County vs. Sisters of Charity, 44 Pac. 252 (Colo.) .
the Colorado ~onstitution expressly exempted "**all**
hospitals for the care of the sick, whether supported in
whole or in part by charity." But even under such liberal
provision of the Constitution, it was held that lands occupied by and used in connection with such hospitals are
not exempt.
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••Jt is a. well-settled rule that statutes exempting persons or property fron1 taxation art:' to be
strictly construed, and that exemptions art' not
to be extended, by judicial construction, to property other than that which is expressly designted by law:' Cooley, Taxation. pp. ~0-t-~05.
7 C.-J. 1051. ··\\"here the exemption of property from taxation is involved. the distinction
betv;een the benevolent or charitable associations and beneficial associations is sharply drawn.
Laws of e.xemption are to be strictly construed.
A charity is held to mean a public charity, one
whose benefits are extended to needy persons
generally, 'vithout regard to their relation to the
members of the society, or to the fees paid. A
beneficial society whose beneficence is confined
to the members, their families, dependents or
frien~ and depends upon
the contributions
mad~ is not a charity, but a private institution
for the mutual advantage of the members. The
property of such a society is therefore not exempt
from taxation under a law exempting the property of charities.··
City of Knoxville vs. Fort Sanders Hospital, 257 S. W.
408 (Tenn.).

Where hospital with research laboratory

and X-ray outfit was erected and maintained by certain
physicians as a place to treat their patients and to perform their operations and to conduct a school for training
nurses and a big majority of patients were charged very
substantial prices for their accommodations, the property

was held not exempt from tax under a statute similar to
Utah.
City of San Antonio vs. Santa Rosa Infirmary, 249 S.
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W. 498 (Tex.). Hospital which received no gift for its
foundation but purchased its property from another corporation and assumed a legal obligation to pay therefor
and which paid all of its operating expenses from funds
received from patients who were able to pay for their
care, and were charged ordinary hospital rates, and which
hospital, in addition, earned a profit to apply on the purchase price of the property, and on additions and improvements, is not a purely public charity and not exempt.
The fact that a hospital which paid its operating expenses
and realized a profit from patients who were able to and
did pay for their care, devoted a small portion of its activities to the care of patients unable to pay therefor,
does not make it a charitable institution entitled to exemption from taxation.
In the case, City of Vicksburg vs. Sanitarium, 78 So.
702, (Miss.) The court held that a hospital treating some
charity patients, but primarily for pay, that is, primarily
for treatment of those who could pay, was not exempt
under a statute exempting "hospital or other charitable
use."
"Where a hospital is .conducted for the use and
profit of persons engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery, or as an adjunct to a medical
college conducted for the profit of its owners, it
ca·nnot be regarded as a charitable institution,
and is subject to taxation."
257

City of Knoxville vs. Ft. Sanders Hospital (Tenn.)
408.

s.. w.
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Mayor and Aldermen ,.s. Vieksburg Sanitaritnn
(Miss.) 78 S. W. 702.
Gray Street Infirmary vs. City of Louisville (Ky.),
65
w. 11.
The courts often state. and it is undoubtedly a gen-

s.

eral rule followed in the majority of cases, that a hospital
institution \vhich is adn1ittedly charitable and \Vhich was
founded and erected as such, does not lose its charitable
or eleemosynary character by reason of the fact that it
charges and collects from such patients as are able to pay
for the actual necessities furnished, for the amounts thus
received are not for private gain, but contribute to the
more effectual accomplishment of the purpose for which
the charity was founded, to dispense charity to those who
are in need of its services, and who are unable to pay.

Downs vs. Harper ·Hospital, 25 A. L. R. 602, 5 (Mich.).
Trustees of Orphan School vs. Louisville, 40 L. R. A.

119 (Ky.)

But this rule does not apply in case at bar.

Plaintiff was not organized nor created as a charitable
institution nor did it take any patients in as pure charity
patients..
The primary use to which the property is put it to be
considered in determining whether it falls
terms of the exemption.

within

the

Grand Lodge vs. Board of Re-

view, 117 N. E. 1016 (Ill.).
In many cases where the property has been held exempt it has been on the ground and assumption that since
the Lodge, or other owner, was conducted for charitable
or benevolent purposes only, the property in question was
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to be considered as presumably used exclusively for such
purposes.
Lodge vs. Cass County, 113 N. W. 167 (Neb.).
Such reasoning and presumption can not be applied
in the case at bar, for the plaintiff corporation was not
organized as a charitable institution, but as a corporation organized for pecuniary profit.
A clause in a Constitution, exempting property "used
exclusively for public charity", has often been declared
to refer not to the character of the corporation or association owning the property for which the exemption was
sought, but to the nature of its use.
Grand Lodge vs. Taylor 226 S. W. 129 (Ark.).
Chaffee County vs. Denver R. R. Employees, 22 A. L.
R. 902, 203 Pac. 850 (Colo.) .
Lacy vs. Davis 83 N. W. 784 (Iowa).
By the word "Charitable" in a statute exempting
property used exclusively for charitable purposes, is
meant a practical philan.trophy and .not merely the teaching and encouraging of unselfish principles.
Scottish Rite Bldg. Co. vs. County, 17 A. L. R. 1020
(Nebraska).
Vogt vs. Loifisville, Ann. Cas. 1918E 1040 (Ky.).
In Atty. Gen. vs. Detroit, 71 N. W. 632 (Mich.) the
statute contained the following exemption: "Such real
estate as shall be ow.ned and occupied by library, benevolent, charitable, educational and scientific institutions, incorporated under the laws of this State, with the buildings
I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
and other property thereon, while occupied by them solely
for the purposes for \vhich they were encorporated." In
holding that the property of the Masonic Temple Assn.,
was not exen1pt thereunder the court said:

"It is not enough in order to exempt such associations from taxation, that one of the direct or
indirect pur:rn;es or results is benevolent, charity, education, or the promotion of science. They
mJCSt be organized chiefly, if not solely, for one
o-r more of these obiects.
"Where contributions are made by members
who in turn are entitled to certain benefits
from the claimant for exemption, bestowing such
benefits cannot be deemed charity, the benevolent provisions are based upon sufficient legal
consideration, and are in the nature of insuran~ or a mutual benefit society."
State Council vs. Board of Review, 64 N. E. 1104 (Ill.)
Royal Highlanders vs. State 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380

(Nebraska).
In Re: Linen & Woolen Drapers Inst. L. T. N. S. 949
(Eng.).
The rental of a portion of a building belonging to a

Lodge, although devoted to the purposes of the Lodge,
prevents exemption under a statute exempting from taxation property "used exclusively" for purely charitable,
50 L. R. A. 191 (Mo.).

Society vs. Kelley, 42 P. 3 (Ore.) .
Odd Fellows Bldg. Assn., 177 Pac. 214 (Utah).
Grand Lodge of Masons, 78 Atl. 973 (Vt.)
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In Lodge vs. Redus, 29 So. 163 (Miss.) the court said:
"It is said in argument that income is used for
charity, and that makes it the same in effect as
if the property itself was used for charity. But
that is 1not the letter of the law, nor its spirit."
In Phillips vs. St. Louis R. R. Ci., 17 L. R. A (N. S.)
1167 (Mo.)

·The R. R. Co. organized a hospital for the

benefit of its employees who contributed to its support.
The Court said:
"It has but few of the ear marks of a voluntary
benevolent association, nor are there any ear
marks of a public .charity. What is received is
paid for by the receipients. Under the weight
of authority it cannot be held to be a charitable
institution."
In the New Standard Club vs. McRaven, Ann. Cas.
1918E 27 4 the Mississippi Court held: ''One claiming to

fall within the statute exempting property from taxation
has the burden of proof." The New Hampshire Court in
St. Pauls Church vs. City of Concord, Ann. Cas. 1912 A,
350, held: "The burden is upon one claiming his property
exempt from taxation.. to establish the fact by clear proof
that the legislature so intended."
That oral testimony is not admissable to show the
character of an institution was decided in Bishop of St.
John's vs. 'rreasurer, 86 Pac. 1021, at page 1023, the Colorado Court said:
"We think the objection was well taken. The
character of the institution is to be determined
by the purpose of its construction and the man-
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ner of its operation. and ·not by the opinion of
any individual as to whether its work conforms
to his notion of charity or not. ..
In the case of Gitzhoffen vs. Sisters of Holy t ~ross
Hospital Ass'n, 88 Pac. 691 (Utah) our Supreme Court
also held that the question whether or not a hospital was
a charitable institution and the purpose of its organization was to be determined from its Artieles of Incorporation, and not from oral testimony; and in that case the
court held: ''that the articles of incorporation and the
statute showed the corporation in question to be one for
pecuniary profit, and not charity."
An instructive note is also found in 16 L. R. A. ( N.
S.) 830, giving the definitions and charitable character of
claimants of exemption.. The meaning of "charity" as
used in the constitution, is ''a gift to promote the welfare
of others,''-23 LRA 545 (Pa.) To entitle a corporation
to exemption under statute relieving from taxation charitable institutions, etc. it is essential that the paramount
purpose be one of the objects named in the statute, 42
LRA28L
Another instructive annotation is found in 7 Ann.
Cas. 39, where the annotator shows that the great majority of the cases hold with the Illinois case there reported,
that property held by a fraternal beneficial society for
the use of its members is not property held for charitable
purposes within the meaning of the constitutional provision exempting property held for charitable purposes
from taxation, and that being true it must certainly fol-
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low that the mere fact that the hospital has decided to put
all its earnings in a sinking fund and expend the same
from time to time in the further growth and developement
I
of the institution does not make its property exempt from
the payment of its taxes.
At the hearing before the trial court the plaintiff's
counsel· cited a number of cases holding that hospital
property is used exclusively for .charitable purposes, although the hospital charges the patients who enter the institution for care and treatment. But it is submitted that
all those cases are to be distinguished from the case at
bar. For exemple: in the case of St. Elizabeth Hospital vs.
Lancaster County (Neb.) 189 N. W. 981; the court stated
that, "the hospital property is owned and the hospital
was founded by the Franciscan Sisters

that the general

purpose of the sacred order to which these sisters belonged
is to .nurse the sick, and care for the orphans, they are
prompted only by the love of God, and are bound by a
vow of poverty. The property owned by them is used for
the purpose for which they have dedicated their lives."
The court also stated in that case that the burden of gover.nm.ent in caring for the poor is borne by that hospital.
It is very evideht that such facts are widely different
from the facts in

~case

at bar.

Likewise, in the case of 8isters of St. Francis vs.
Board of Review, 83 N. E. 272. This likewise was a case
where the hospital property was owned by the Sisters of
St. Francis. The court stated, it was organized, "not for
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pecuniary profit, but for the purpose of conductin~: a hospital and training school for nurses. Patients who are
lt~ithout 1~1oney are ca,.ed {o,. ·u,itllO'ut any cha.rge being
made and ap·e deJuYntinated, "char-ity patie-nt.",· No such
facts appear in the case at bar. In our case all patients
are charged if the patient is impecunious the bishop of
the ward, the relief society, etc., or the County n1ust pay
the hospital fee.
In the case of New England Sanitarium vs. Stonehatn
91 N. E. 385 (Mass.) The court found that the hospital
was incorporated ''for the purpose of founding a hospital
or charitable asylum, for the care and relief of indigent,
or other sick or infirm persons,'' etc.. This was the main
purpose of founding the hospital, although the articles
also provide that the hospital may receive pay patients.
No such provision are to be found in the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff hospital in case at bar. The court
also observed "if petitioner had decided to receive only
those patients who were able to pay until from the accumulated profits the institution could be maintained solely
for the relief of the poor, the real estate during the period
of accumulation would not have been occupied exclusively
for charitable purposes within the meaning of the statutes." The hospital in case at bar is charging all patients
and is accumulating its earnings in a sinking fund, $5000,
the net earnings for the year was set aside in such sinking fund for the year 1928. Yet plaintiff claims its property should be exempt for that year.
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In the Lutheran Hospital vs. Baker, 167 N. W. 148
(S. D.), the court stated that the "plaintiff is organized
under the .civil code relating to benevolent corporations.
The articles provide that its plan of operation shall be to
orga~ize and establish a suitable hospital as a church
charity or benevolent society. The articles of incorporation and the charter permit of no capital stock to be issued.
The association provides that in case the patient is unabbe
to pay no charge of any kind is made, and that the attending physician s.hall in sruch cases donate his services.
·When the patient~s are urtabl~ to pay the regular rates
they ,a1ie only asked and required to pay what they reasmably can." It will be readily seen that all of these facts
widely distinguish the above case from case at bar. In
the above case 95<fo of the patients are pay patients and
5<fo were pure .charity patients, many of the pay patients
were probably only part pay. The court said: "We are of
the opinion that the appellant is a corporation or society
organized and conducted exclusively for charitable purposes and that its said property was and is used exclusively
for such purposes." In the Baker case the court reasoned
as did this Court in the Quinn, Groesbeck and Odd Fellow's cases. Such reasoning as we have seen, can not be
applied to the case at bar because plaintiff corporation is
not and wa:s not organized as a charitable institution.
We fully agree with the principal laid down in the
Baker case, that an institution founded as a purely public
charity does not lose its .character as such merely from
the fact that it receives revenue from, or charges its pat-
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ients who are able to pay. The South Dakota Court distinguished the Baker case from the case of State ,.s. Board
of Equalization 92 N. W. lt), in \vhich case there was evidence that part of the hospital property of the charitable

institution was being rented out, and the rents devoted to
the upkeep and maintenance of the hospital.
We do not have access to several other cases cited by

plaintiffs counsel, but we believe that everyone of the
cases can be distinguished in the same manner as the cases
just cited.
If this court shall be of the opinion that the evidence

in this case is sufficient to warrant the Findings of the
Court that the plaintiff's property was used exclusively
for charitable purposes and is therefore exempt, then we
respectfully submit and urge that the trial court erred in
denying the defendanfs motion for a new trial, on account

of error of the court in excluding the testimony of defendant's witnesses in proof of defendant's allegation in his
answer that plaintiff corporation charged large and substantial fees in 1928, and for many years prior thereto
from all its patients, and that it had on various occasions
during that period held and detained patients at the hos-

pital until the hospital fees were paid, these allegations
were specifically denied by the reply thus putting in issue
the conduct and operation of the plaintiff hospital not
only for the year 1928, but for many years prior thereto.
In other words, the period of time put in issue was
not only the year 1928, but many years prior thereto, and
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upon such issues the defendant's counsel prepared their
case. We accordingly had a large number of witnesses
who covered eight or ten years, a:nd who had had the experience of being detained at the hospital or having their
loved ones held until the hospital fees were paid. But the
court arbitrarily refused to allow these witnesses to testify. We submit that defendant's evidence and offer to
prove by these witnesses that not only did the plaintiff
hospital charge all patients, including poor patients who
were unable to pay, but upon many occasions had actually
detained the patient and refused to allow him or her to
leave the hospital until the hospital fees were paid, was
admissable under the issues formed by the pleadings.
We submit that the action of the trial court in thus
arbitrarily refusing to permit these witnesses to testify
to such conduct on behalf of the plaintiff hospital was reversible error in view of the issues which had been made,
and in view of plaintiff's contention that its property was
exempt because used exclusively for charitable purposes.
There is no contention on behalf of the plaintiff that
the policy in 1928 was different in a.ny respect from prior
years. In fact, Dr. D. C. Budge, stated the policy was· the
same. As stated in our affidavit for a new trial, had the
issues been narrowed down to the year 1928, by the plead.ings, then defendant would then have concentrated its
efforts upon securing witnesses to testify as to the conduct of the hospital covering only that year. But inasmuch as the issues were made broader and were made to
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cover not only the year 1928. but tnany uears p·rior

th~·reto,

we had a right to reply upon the pleading'S and to prepare

our case accordingly, and the court's ruling in excluding
this offered_testimony by defendant covering said period,
and which would affirmatively show the real policy of
plaintiff hospital, was reversible error.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE D. PRESTON
LEON FONNESBECK
Attorneys for Defendant and AppeUcmt.
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